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Second, neither ‘Arafat nor the PLO were 
prepared to sign an agreement or enter into 
negotiations with Israel, nor even enter into a 
measure of self-rule without a firm promise of 
a state. Why did Israel have such intense op-
position to the PLO? The author fails to men-
tion years of PLO-sponsored terrorism and 
hundreds of deaths that the PLO inflicted on 
Israel at Munich, Ma‘alot, and elsewhere, in 
multiple airplane hijackings and in the killings 
of American diplomats in Sudan and Leba-
non. ‘Arafat and the PLO are given a pass for 
bad decisions and terrorist action because it 
decided for 15 years not to drop either “armed 
struggle” or violence against Israel. In 1987, 
‘Arafat said, “any nation that loses the mili-
tary option does not deserve to live . . . con-
tinue building up force until we reach a stra-
tegic military balance with the Israeli enemy.”4 
Months later, he confirmed, “we absolutely 
reject negotiations with the Israeli enemy.”5 As 
‘Arafat told envoys to President Carter, he in-
sisted on a promise of self-determination as a 
prerequisite to talks. On September 12, 1993, 
‘Arafat recognized Israel’s right to exist, still 
without a promise of self-determination.
Third, what were the implications of 
the 15-year delay? In October 1988, Nabil 
Sha‘ath, a PLO Executive Committee mem-
ber said, “no matter the faults of Camp Da-
vid, it gave us an opportunity to have our 
legitimate rights considered. We were not 
prepared for Camp David.”6 Looking back, 
Egyptian president Husni Mubarak noted in 
1992, “Today we regret not having imple-
mented Camp David. Today 75 percent of 
the occupied territories are covered with set-
tlements. We had them in our hands without 
settlements. Today some still say that they 
reject the Camp David accords.”7 Anziska 
4. Yasir ‘Arafat, Algiers Voice of Palestine, 
November 28, 1987, transcripted in Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Middle 
East and North Africa, December 1, 1987. 
5. al-Hawadith (London), January 29, 1988.
6. Interview by the reviewer with Nabil 
Sha‘ath, October 2, 1988, Cairo.
7. Remarks by Egyptian President Husni 
Mubarak, Cairo Egypt Radio Network, April 30, 
1992, as quoted in FBIS, Middle East and North 
Africa, May 1, 1992.
concurs that the PLO delay was a political 
error, writing: “there were only four thou-
sand Jewish settlers in the West Bank and 
Gaza when Begin entered office in 1977, 
and by the end of 1992 there were more than 
100,000” (p. 300).
History’s unfolding does not give re-
funds; there are no do-overs. The burden for 
bad choices or bad timing often rests with 
leadership. ‘Arafat made many bad choices 
for the Palestinian national movement, not 
the least of which was his personal refusal 
to enter negotiations, or even test them sin-
cerely with the most pro-Palestinian US 
president of the 20th century.
Kenneth Stein is the author of Heroic 
Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin 
and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace (Rout-
ledge, 1999). He teaches Middle Eastern 
history and political science at Emory 
University.
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Reviewed by Robert Looney
Every once in a while, a volume appears 
that explains the need for a paradigm shift in 
our thinking as to the way the world works. 
Jim Krane’s Energy Kingdoms, which as-
sesses the rentier state model as applied in 
the Gulf context, is such a volume. Krane 
begins his fascinating account of energy 
subsidies in the Gulf region with an often-
quoted line attributed to Saudi Arabia’s 
King Faisal bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud: “In 
one generation we went from riding camels 
to riding Cadillacs. The way we are wasting 
money, I fear the next generation will be rid-
ing camels again” (p. 1). 
As Krane aptly observes, substituting oil 
for money sets the tone for his volume.
While acknowledging significant differ-
ences between the Gulf countries — Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United 
